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Chancery was a court that became infamous for provoking anger, contempt, distrust, 
and disgust, even loathing and rage, two basic emotions that feature right at the centre 
of Robert Plutchik’s three-dimensional emotions wheel. Chancery never became well 
known for the positive basic emotion of joy.1 Yet, some litigants must have experienced 
a happy outcome. All literary representations of Chancery have been overwhelmingly 
negative. Charlotte Smith’s The Old Manor House of 1793 portrayed the jealous 
viciousness of Mrs Lennard and her hidden will alongside the stifling orderliness of the 
court, with its dull annual reports and opaque precedents.2 In 1920, John Galsworthy 
gave us In Chancery, one volume of the Forsyte family chronicle focused on the 
unforgettably mean and proud ‘man of property’, Soames Forsyte, whose ‘possessive 
instinct never stands still’ and extends to his wife.3 Again the court of Chancery 
featured almost as a metonym for people who were jealous and obsessive and deeply 
interfering. And then there is Bleak House. The trundling and cripplingly expensive 
case over a disputed will, which Charles Dickens named Jarndyce v Jarndyce, played to 
a knowing readership, though, ironically, the court so hated by the Victorians had a 
structure and procedures that originally developed from the late sixteenth century under 
Thomas Egerton, Lord Ellesmere, in response to the weight of demand. There are two 
questions, then, to answer in relation to human emotions and Chancery in the critical 
period of its expansion of business. First, what emotions did early modern litigants 
bring to Chancery – at least, according to the records left behind – and were the 
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emotions gendered? Second, what emotions did early modern litigants express about 
Chancery itself? To answer these questions this chapter uses Chancery pleadings and 
cause papers (bills, answers, replications, and rejoinders) of plaintiff/s and defendant/s 
for the period 1550 to 1650 and a range of early printed sources about the court.4 
Answers to the two questions, no matter how tentative, are important in addressing 
current historiography about social relations and the functionality of the court. 
Chancery records offer a richness of evidence for social and economic 
historians. Annie Abram was one of the first to recognize this when she ploughed them 
for material for English Life and Manners in the Middle Ages (1913).5 The economic 
historian, Maurice Beresford, also once pointed out that the decree rolls alone provide 
quantitative data for agrarian history and qualitative material embedded in the records of 
disputes over earthenware pots, theatre mortgages, and ‘the affairs of orphans, widows, 
almshouses, apprentices, schools, and the like’.6 In other words, Chancery records 
reveal the stuff of life and recently a number of historians have been mining them for 
information on the complexities of early modern markets and the economy and the 
networks of debt and obligation that held together (or pulled apart) families and 
communities.7 Early modern people resorted to Chancery because of the dependence of 
local communities on legal intervention when self-policing tactics proved ineffective. 
The link between neighbourly relations and kinship with Chancery is dialectical and 
complex. Chancery, which was an equity court, made decisions based on the concept of 
fairness. It was, therefore, embedded in collective, local consciousness as a space for the 
articulation of emotions in exchange for redress. There were striking overlaps of 
jurisdiction in the period, between, for example, Queen’s/King’s Bench and Chancery, 
but it was equity – or ‘positive law’ – that most actively legislated in the arena of 
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emotive legal cases.8 The Statutes of Parliaments regulated the trade of everything from 
grain and pigs to buttons and lace, but it was the equity courts – and increasingly 
Chancery – that dealt with actual human interaction during trade.9 
Chancery made an impact on private life because early modern families were 
essentially small, private businesses in a world comprised of multifarious and 
interconnected small family businesses. Chancery’s caseload overlapped with that of the 
common law courts, but crucially, it accommodated litigation by married as well as 
single women, raising the expectation of its role as an arbiter of family relationships. 
Chancery had the power to issue original writs (as well as decrees and orders), which 
parties in a case had to respond to, and it even mopped up marital disputes from the 
ecclesiastical courts.10 Chancery cases frequently had at their heart a person’s will, as 
petitioners sued executors for legacies and chattel, widows sued for dower, and children 
sued for their portions. Kinship between litigants was actually a reason to sue, Chancery 
being seen as a court that ‘would entertain a cause where kinship or other connections 
might influence a judgement’.11 Humphrey and Mary Abell took Mary’s mother, Agnes 
Warry, to Chancery in 1628 over a copyhold cottage, pasture, meadow, and arable farm 
at Foxton in Somerset because Agnes’s possession or use of the estate did not respect 
Mary’s inheritance by manorial custom despite all solicitations put to her ‘in friendly 
manner’.12 In this case, the plaintiffs claimed they could get no relief either by manorial 
custom or common law because the manorial roll had disappeared. The duplication of 
jurisdiction across different courts was neither unusual nor theoretically problematic – 
though not without an element of competition too – because the petitioning process was 
considered to be an appeal directly to the queen’s/king’s conscience when avenues of 
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relief had been sought by people in vain and they were left with nothing but due 
complaint.13 
Increased use of wills after the Statute of Wills in 1540 was one cause for the 
climbing number of suits brought to Chancery and this alone brought the court more 
squarely into the emotional centre of people’s lives in local communities.14 The 
presence of testamentary proceedings in a case guaranteed high emotional content 
because, as Philippa Maddern once pointed out, unlike court records, wills ‘marked, if 
not the only, at least the most significant moment in a testator’s life’ and can be filled 
with ‘apparently artless outbursts of affection, suspicion or concern’.15 The wills of 
Robert Angell and his son caused emotional mayhem. Robert left a written will in 1628 
splitting his lands between his two sons, Robert and John, with the proviso that if one 
son died without issue the whole inheritance would go to the other son. Robert died 
leaving a daughter and when John died she expected to inherit the remainder of the 
estate, but John Angell left a nuncupative will, stating in front of several witnesses at his 
deathbed that ‘if I thought I should be any worse I would send for my sister Ann … my 
sister should know how sick I am … [she] is likely to be heire of all I have’.16 Ill and 
emotional, John Angell suddenly yearned for his sister and he left ambiguous evidence 
about her being the ‘likely heir’, ‘must be heire’, and probably ‘sole heir’, and that ‘she 
might have all that I have for there is none to debar her of it’ – except, of course, his 
niece.17 
Bernard Capp and Linda Pollock have both argued that emotional displays, 
especially angry outbursts in public, were discouraged in early modern England, 
Pollock arguing that in studying the emotions it is crucial to understand their culturally 
specific and situated use. The emotions – or passions in early modern humoral 
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understanding of their bodily operation – feature within concepts like virtue, suggesting 
that demonstrations of despair might actually have a positive connotation when 
articulated in the space of a court. Rightly, Pollock suggests that the modern researcher 
needs to ask not only how we recognize emotions such as anger in the past, but also 
when an apparently negative emotion might be perceived as positive in one situation 
and only negative in another.18 According to Capp, early modern people ‘though easily 
roused to anger, were committed to the ideal of “good neighbourliness”’.19 Lawsuits 
were not considered positive conduits for uncontrolled emotions, but were rather a 
breach of Christian charity and an act that abandoned early modern ideals of ‘kindness’, 
reciprocal obligation, and reconciliation of conflict.20 Craig Muldrew has spoken, for 
example, of cultural norms of ‘concord, reconciliation and peaceable relations’.21 There 
is a puzzle in the historiography here. Certainly the language of consensus versus 
conflict – expressed as kindness or unkindness – is dichotomous and loaded with 
cultural meaning that travelled from village and town to the court of Chancery in cause 
pleadings and depositions. Unkindness was a term that expressed the concept of 
uncharitable behaviour extended to kin and lack of Christian charity afforded to the 
weaker person in a social relationship.22 The widow Anne Amundersham explained her 
case in 1588 by deposing that her brother-in-law, Charles Monck, tried to ‘molest, sue 
and vexe’ her for debts owed to him after ‘some unkindness’ had fallen out between her 
and her sister and that he now treated her, ‘a desolate and a comfortless widow’, by 
‘expostulating of many unkindnesses’.23 It is a little difficult, therefore, to square the 
early modern ideal of social harmony with cases like that of Anne Amundersham and 
the statistics also require explanation. From the late sixteenth century onwards, there 
were ‘about 60,000 suits being initiated yearly before the central courts’ and the London 
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Consistory Court alone witnessed a rise in female defamation cases which ‘substantially 
outflanked demographic change’.24 Marital litigation cases in the Court of Requests also 
‘expanded steadily’ from the 1590s.25 Tim Stretton has recently challenged what he 
calls the ‘surprisingly positive vision of the meaning and effect of rising interpersonal 
conflict’, and he argues that just because much value was placed on neighbourly 
relations, there is no reason to suppose that rising levels of litigation did not intensify 
pressure on local communities and lead to heightened social conflict within them.26 
Alexandra Shepard has reached the same conclusion in her work on the university 
courts in Cambridge.27 
The dialectical process of information and emotions exchange between 
community and court is one that is worth considering further. Landed and mercantile 
families depended on good relations with neighbours and kin to thrive and survive as 
economic units and individuals would spend very large sums on lawyers to settle 
disputes and also to maintain the good reputation needed to do business. The ‘chains of 
credit’ in rural and market towns depended on central courts like Chancery ‘to maintain 
the trust upon which credit was based’.28 Growing use of wills and strict settlements 
from the late sixteenth century reflected economic and concomitant social change. The 
transactional nature of interpersonal relations hardened because of the legal 
complexities of expanded commerce. Muldrew points to ‘the sheer complexity of 
innumerable reciprocal obligations’, and argues that the early modern market 
constituted a dense web of promissory notes and bonds.29 Stretton has also recently 
suggested that economic change itself, ‘as the exchange value of money eclipsed its use 
value’, resulted in more family and community disputes accompanied by erosion of 
faith in the law courts to sort them out.30 Wills and settlements were, effectively, private 
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law, but when disputes arose, the overlapping jurisdictions of common law and equity 
law were needed to resolve ambiguous legal entitlements. The question arises, then, 
about Chancery as an expanding arena for articulation of emotions. 
The anthropological view would be that if the material interests of individuals 
are viewed as integral to the internal dynamics of family relationships and the relational 
in communities, then emotion becomes a vital category of analysis.31 In early modern 
English society, the twinned concepts of trust and honour were invoked to encapsulate 
the sense of being ill treated over material things in life. They were concepts that 
became a legal trope, placed centrally (in terms of persuasive location) within Chancery 
pleadings. They were lent secondary efficacy by the idea that coercion and obstruction 
had been the cause of a person’s misery. For example, Anne Amundersham’s bill to 
Chancery stated that she had placed ‘great trust and confidence’ in her brother-in-law, 
before he started charging her interest on her debts.32 The linguistic construction is 
multiplied many times over in pleadings. Anne Drewe’s pleadings provide evidence of 
coercion. She took out two bills in Chancery in 1608 accusing several people of 
obstructing her right to title so that she could not ‘peacablie and quietlie’ enjoy her 
farming land and woodland in Hampshire.33 She deposed that the defendants broke trust 
by not listening to reason, by taking possession of the land through ‘casuall or other 
meanes’ and by hiding, altering, and defacing documents to force her off her land.34 
Early modern credit relations were, thus, inseparable from and linked to 
sociability. They were also, therefore, linked to gender construction, especially in terms 
of masculine or feminine trust and honour. All Chancery statements were transformed 
into legal evidence by an oath being sworn on the Bible. How litigants were supposed to 
behave while under oath was influenced by the gender expectations of conduct books. 
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In terms of the litigant’s cognitive appraisal of a situation, they were reporting not only 
on factual information but its emotional impact as transformative (in the present and/or 
future) of their material and emotional wellbeing. Affective events became infused by 
gender expectations into a document of legal persuasion. Male litigants were bound by 
an amphibolous language of honour that incorporated ideas straight out of Baldassare 
Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier such as chivalry, courtesy, and civility. Male 
honour outside the court intersected with the language of pride and indignation during a 
Chancery case. Richard Bowdler, a merchant’s factor, brought a suit in 1620 against 
George Morgan, a merchant he supplied, complaining that Morgan had fiddled the 
books. Morgan was literally ‘called to account’, the court having the authority to 
subpoena an individual to produce documents and records for scrutiny by a group of 
appointed commissioners. He was ordered to pay £579 6s. and was outraged at the 
breach of trust shown by Bowdler and by the impact of the Chancery decision on his 
reputation as a man whose honour was under-written by his financial honesty. He 
counter-sued, Chancery overturned the decree and Bowdler was ordered to pay £7,486 
1s. 10d. But matters did not stop there – to clear his name and restore his honour, 
Bowdler then petitioned Parliament to have the proceedings in Chancery made void.35 
One of the men felt concerned enough about their male reputation to have the whole 
proceedings published in a broadside for a public airing. 
Men’s litigiousness is well known, though women’s litigiousness has also 
become more clearly understood through the work of Laura Gowing and Tim Stretton 
among others.36 Approximately 10 per cent of all cases in Chancery were brought by 
single female plaintiffs (mostly feme sole, though some feme covert as well). A much 
higher percentage still of cases featured women as uxor.37 The ‘culture of litigation’, 
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suggests Stretton, witnessed a proportionally greater rise in female litigation than male 
in the Court of Requests. It rose from about 25 per cent during the reign of Elizabeth to 
about 40 per cent by the end of the reign of James VI and I, some of the increase being 
accounted for by spillage from Chancery after a decision made by Chancellor Hatton in 
1589 to move smaller Chancery cases.38 The impact of female gender construction in 
Chancery was complicated because two sets of dualisms came into play in the instance 
of every woman litigant to intersect with their position – plaintiff or defendant – in 
relation to the legal case. First was the dualism of the quiet and ordered Christian 
woman who co-existed with the woman of medical texts who was controlled at times by 
her passions such as uterine fury and absence of reason. Male plaintiffs, often acting in 
collusion with their wives, could use the very effective tactic of suggesting a female 
defendant’s loss of reason to undermine her evidence. Agnes Warry’s son-in-law and 
daughter made repeated reference to the way in which she ‘withstood the orators’, 
‘fayning … excuses’ about how she ‘could not but to her greate losse remove the goods 
she had’ in the house they wanted from her.39 Perhaps unsurprisingly, when she came to 
write her will Agnes decided not to include her daughter and son-in-law.40 The universe 
of kin expanded and contracted contingently during the emotional moment of making a 
will, as Maddern has shown, and wills often revealed nothing about inter vivos property 
transfer, whether this had been through amicable indenture or the legal force of an 
unwelcome Chancery order.41  
The second dualism, of course, was the legal one of feme sole/feme covert. The 
never-married feme sole could be seen as being as susceptible as the feme sole widow to 
the manipulative behaviours of the more powerful in society, who were, by default, 
men. In 1638, Katherine Proctor, the niece of a wealthy yeoman farmer, Miles Proctor, 
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lodged a bill of complaint in Chancery against a ‘confederacy’ of men who, ‘by practice 
and combinacion [sic] among them’, had fraudulently taken possession of her uncle’s 
land when she was ‘the right heir and next of blood’.42 The answer of the main 
protagonist made an appeal to the cultural expectation that Proctor would want to find a 
male heir. He deposed that Miles Proctor’s last words were to call him ‘my brother’.43 
Even though the two men were not, in any way, blood related, he tried to invoke kinship 
through their shared masculinity. Miles Proctor’s widow, as executor of her husband’s 
will, was crucial to the defeat of the men, as she could bring together in her witness 
statements her widow’s despair with the important legal responsibility she held to 
protect her husband’s interests and wishes.44 The emotional content of the Proctor 
women’s case was heavy indeed – the embattled widow and her defenceless niece – and 
they won. However, a single woman plaintiff or defendant could also fall prey to the 
gender expectation of women’s weakness in the face of temptation. The covetous, 
greedy woman was a caricature of satirical pamphlets and ballads that crossed over into 
representation of female litigants in court evidence. In 1619, the married plaintiffs 
Edward and Susan Alston accused Elizabeth Elsam of behaving ‘contrary to all right 
equity’ by fraudulently plotting to keep all of her late husband’s estate to ‘the benefitt’ 
of herself.45 She was accused of being deceitful and dishonourable in hiding 
conveyances and the probate inventory of her husband’s chattels so that they could not 
establish his worth at death and they put this down to her greed.46 
Married couples came to Chancery with different expectations arising from 
conflicting advice. Women under coverture were expected to manage family money and 
assets wisely in their role as household managers, but men expected to have the final 
say. Marriage manuals occasionally advised women to place their family’s interests 
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ahead of husbands who were feckless.47 Case law laid down by the Lord Chancellor’s 
decree of 1467 was unequivocal: ‘whatever a married woman does may be said to be 
done for dread of her husband.’48 However, research on coverture has revealed that the 
agency of a woman under coverture was rather greater than this would suggest and 
Chancery cases do reveal a greater ambiguity in the treatment of married women than 
one might expect.49 There were also subtly different gender expectations in relation to 
the type of property involved. The wealth that was invested in chattels rather than land 
or capital was feminized in a way that could favour female litigants; but not always, and 
only if there was not a clash of female interests. In a pleading of 3 May 1593, Lady 
Elizabeth Weston was accused by her son-in-law, Thomas Bishop, of ‘secretly and 
covertlye’ keeping ‘jewells, money, goods and chattels … being of greate vallue’ which 
had been the property of her dead husband.50 Thomas Bishop was interested in the 
portable investment value of the jewels, but his wife, Jane, the other plaintiff, felt an 
additional emotional attachment to the material objects themselves: ‘one jewell called a 
flower of dyamonde … one jewell called a cross of dyamonde … one jewell with 
pictures enamylled … dyvers pettycoats of great vallue.’51 These, of course, had 
belonged to her deceased mother. Thomas and Jane Bishop believed that Elizabeth 
Weston had placed these in ‘some secret place’, but Elizabeth Weston deposed that her 
husband, while alive, had given jewellery and clothes away ‘to her greate misliking’, 
because she, also, wanted the highly personal items that were missing, including the 
first wife’s clothes.52 
However, the key to a history of emotions and gender expectations in Chancery 
does not just lie in searching for descriptive evidence in the court records about the 
feelings of female and male litigants about property. Chancery was embedded in the 
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social history of England and it existed in dialectical relation to the people who brought 
cases and participated in evidence collection. The habitus of Chancery lay in its 
constantly adapting structure and organizing principles, producing collective practices 
understood by Chancery officials and litigants alike.53 Chancery, just like other 
overlapping social structures such as kin, household, and church, was a generator of 
community, the manifestations and representations of which changed over time. As 
Susan Broomhall and others have shown in relation to the household, Chancery 
accommodated ‘multiple emotional communities’, emotions themselves potentially 
creating constellations of power and individual agency.54 The interaction between 
individuals and the court was complex not least because it existed to serve their needs. 
Chancery was representative of the monarch and a two-way conduit for what Patrick 
Collinson once called ‘monarchical republicanism’.55 The monarch’s negotiating power 
for and with the public was the reward litigants received in exchange for their 
obedience. In Chancery, the power of litigants lay in being ruled and being granted ‘the 
weapons of the weak’, which included use of their emotions to appeal to the monarch’s 
conscience.56 Their initial bill of complaint represented what John Walter would call a 
legitimate ‘public transcript’, or protest about their condition.57 Litigants, witnesses, and 
Chancery officials were all inescapably linked by emotions not least because, as Robert 
Plutchik once argued, cognitive feedback loops produce emotions and the increased 
autonomic activities that lead to cognitive actions (a neuroscientist would say through 
the production of multiple monoamine neurotransmitters) produce overt behaviours 
(often gendered) and outcomes or effects.58 Put more simply, the physiological changes 
that took place when interaction between court and litigants created emotions led 
themselves to the cognitive decisions that decided further interaction. Indeed, one 
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question worth asking is if Dickens, in his portrayal of Jarndyce v Jarndyce, captured in 
fictional form the litigant and court trapped in a cycle of emotional cause and effect. 
The imagined central presence of the monarch is an important key to 
understanding the strategies and responses of litigants in Chancery. Chancery was one 
of the English central law courts, the origins of which lay in the medieval royal court. 
After the common law courts separated from the Curia Regis at the end of the thirteenth 
century, the justice that was still thought to be vested in the office (and, therefore, 
natural body) of the king led to petitioning the king for redress if justice was not thought 
to be delivered elsewhere. The petitions were referred on to the Chancellor, who, by the 
end of the fourteenth century, dealt with all the business of the court with the help of 
legal clerks.59 The original locus of Chancery was wherever the Lord Chancellor 
happened to be, including his household where he read petitions and affidavits in a case 
and reached a verdict, though by 1550 his office was associated with the smaller and 
larger Inns of Court around Chancery Lane.60 Some legal historians regard Chancery as 
an embryonic English civil service or ‘the original bureaucratic department of state’.61 
However, it was in the construct of conscience that Chancery located and found its 
raison d’être. The Lord Chancellor in Chancery came to represent the monarch’s 
conscience, so that effectively he became the chief interpreter of the king’s law of 
equity. Both king/queen and Chancery jurisdiction were embedded in the lex terrae: 
‘[w]hat Chancery does is part of the law of the land.’62 Therefore, in its very 
constitution Chancery was a court that dealt with people’s emotions and the focus of 
their emotional engagement with the court was the Lord Chancellor himself. He was the 
only judge; his authority was law, not least because he could overturn judgements at 
common law and conscience itself became seen as ‘rooted in some higher law’.63 
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Litigants saw the Lord Chancellor’s power of governance and authority in the localities, 
whether urban or rural, as supreme in property and money-matters close to the heart. 
For this reason petitioners to Chancery appended very personalized statements to their 
causes. ‘And the Orators shall dayly pray for your lord[shi]pp in health’, said Humphrey 
and Mary Abell when trying to reclaim her father’s tenancy of a cottage and farm in 
Foxton.64 
The origins of most of the business and case law of Chancery lie in cases such as 
Messynden v Pierson (c. 1420) when Thomas Messynden discovered that the feoffees of 
his father’s land refused him the right to come into the land and he appealed on the 
grounds that he ‘can have no recovery at common law’.65 Cases were, therefore, not just 
emotional in content, but emotional in process. The language of no recovery of an 
entitlement changed not at all and became a mainstay of Chancery business. Through 
emotional pleas, plaintiffs had to claim ‘non-recovery’ at common law or the need for 
discovery of documents that would prove their common law right. Quite a bit of non-
recovery business came from copyhold cases (because of the weaker position of the 
tenant in relation to the lord of the manor) and Chancery came to have effective control 
of the rolls. Mostly these cases were a plea for recovery of tenure through sighting the 
copy in the rolls, plaintiffs requesting a search for the entry.66 Elizabeth Angell, who 
was the only daughter and heir of John Angell of London, claimed that she could not 
access possession of her father’s lands in 1648 because ‘by some sinister and casuall 
meanes’ some of her kin had concealed title deeds which she asked the court to have 
‘discovered’ so that she should enjoy ‘recovery of her rights by law’.67 Female plaintiffs 
deploying the language of being wronged laid claim to an enhanced embedded 
emotional content because of their sex. However, it was not simple and social status 
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also enhanced the emotional impact of a plea. In the case of Alan Best, a yeoman, in 
1597, redress was sought from the fraud of Lady Anne Brooke, whom he accused of 
hiding an inventory linked to a will.68 Widows had pleading power by virtue of their 
vulnerability and this could be doubled in relation to a man of better social standing. 
The widow Margaret Baynes took a goldsmith, Robert Myles, to Chancery when he 
tried to evict her from an inn previously owned by her husband.69 Certain phrases 
developed that bent and shaped emotions to the needs of equity law and became in 
themselves legal tropes that formed the building blocks to resolution of the case and 
decree. Bills were drawn up claiming ‘the sufferance of the plaintiff’, ‘wrongful 
dealings’, and a desire ‘to be relieved’.70 In this way, emotions had to be performed and 
enacted in order to build the legal case. Indeed, the performance of emotions in the 
court setting, as Philippa Maddern once pointed out, actually produced legal 
decisions.71 In other words, emotions, procedures, and process were all inextricably 
linked and channelled through the generic labels that litigants and deponents used to 
describe others – ‘solicitous husband’ or ‘cruel guardian’, for instance – as they 
recorded their case or supported the case of an ally. There was an intersection between 
emotional social categorization and social expectations, including those of gender, 
status, and age. The ‘grieving widow’ was more than just a legal category describing 
feme covert – it was an emotionally loaded trope designed to invoke the Lord 
Chancellor’s pity in order to influence his decision and win the case. 
Chancery was a bill of procedure court. Early Chancery drew up bills in legal 
French, but by 1550 a standardized form of ‘Chancery English’ was being used.72 
Standardization was the result of the sheer weight of work and the development of 
training of lawyers in the Inns of Court.73 Use of the vernacular rendered attorneys and 
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legal clerks accessible to litigants who brought to them the myriad small (and large) 
annoyances and disappointments of daily life, which were then transcribed and collated 
as pleadings by clerks at the request of one complainant or complainants (the plaintiffs). 
A set of interrogatories was determined and put to the defendant/s, who then needed to 
lodge their answers with lawyers. In some cases, the plaintiff/s followed this with a 
replication to the answer and the defendant/s then had right of rejoinder. Stretton has 
demonstrated that many of the cases brought to Chancery were shifted from the 
common law courts, often for strategic reasons. Indeed, he suggests that many cases 
were vexatious as people used the court essentially as an appellant court to claim no 
recovery at common law or require discovery of evidence. When pleading sufficiency at 
common law, plaintiffs needed to claim that the case at common law was fraudulent in 
some way.74 Maurice Beresford noted in many cases involving land enclosure that ‘the 
combat of the initial pleadings is soon revealed as a posture’.75 However, performance 
and posture is never entirely devoid of emotion and is always something more situated 
and lived than performativity suggests. The emotional process prompted by following 
procedure often intensified when each side called their witnesses (or deponents). 
Witnesses also testified after being sworn in by an oath taken on the Bible before giving 
their answers to interrogatories put to them by men of standing commissioned by the 
court. Witness re-telling of events was as much of a performance, including the 
narrative of emotion needed for persuading the court of the reliability of themselves and 
their evidence. The commissioners who took the evidence were metaphorically given 
‘the keyes to the libertie of England’, commanding ‘full power and authoritie to 
examine diligentlie all witnesses’ and so the legitimate authority they wielded made 
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them the temporary locus of an emotional public transcript as the case unfolded in 
layers of emotionally crafted evidence.76 
Chancery cases are best understood not as something that took place in one of 
the central law courts, but as taking place in a fluid environment that existed between 
the court (wherever it was sitting) and multiple communities spread out like a web 
throughout the kingdom. And because ‘Chancery subsisted on the deficiencies of the 
common law and on pleas of defective evidence and partiality’ it was always dealing 
with litigants who were disaffected both with their neighbours and the legal system.77 It 
heard petitions from plaintiffs whose power relationship to the defendant was 
sometimes so unequal that they might not get a fair deal and could be subject to force or 
duress. It heard cases in which the plaintiff was desperately seeking relief from a bond, 
such as Barrantyne v Jeckett of 1553/4.78 The very nature of equitable justice meant that 
from the outset, Chancery was a court that heard from and about people who were 
already disaffected or feeling vulnerable with one another and with the law. Equitable 
justice could only be arrived at by using ‘conscience as a criterion of judgement’, but, of 
course, this remained a rather uncertain principle even as the legal language of 
conscience seeped into public consciousness.79 Dennis Klinck has observed that the 
Coke–Ellesmere jurisdictional conflict in the early seventeenth century did lead to 
reflection on conscience, its meaning and impact and, according to Klinck, Puritan 
writers, notably William Perkins, defined equity as the interplay between the role of the 
magistrate and the moderation of social interactions that altered – for the better – the 
conduct of private individuals.80 Certainly Mark Fortier has spoken of a ‘culture of 
equity’ that mixed ideas of Christian equity with the language emerging from Chancery 
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and the concept was used as a tool of moral persuasion in literary works of drama, 
poetry, and history to form part of the English cultural heritage.81 
Litigants understood the role of conscience in their lives. However, this does not 
preclude them disagreeing with equity decisions in their individual cases. In Chancery 
some suits, by definition of ‘discovery and recovery’, were short, only getting to the bill 
stage and the legal drama could be unfolding elsewhere. Anna and Toby Chapman, for 
example, in 1617, asked for the discovery and recovery of her father’s will and the 
probate inventory which were not ‘at large’ because of ‘secret plots’ involving both of 
her brothers; she only wanted her marriage portion of £100 out of her father’s £4,000, 
but in the standard emotional appeal she claimed that her brothers were trying to 
defraud her of her ‘sole and only maintenance and meanes’.82 The common span of 
cases was about two to three years with up to five years not unusual.83 Cases that 
involved multiple suits and went on for many years did exist and they were the ones 
most responsible for escalating conflict at home and against the court. Perhaps the best 
example is that of John Barterham. Described by contemporaries as ‘a headstrong 
litigious Man’, Barterham pursued multiple cases over more than three decades.84 He 
became ‘utterlie consumed in tedious and expensive suites of Law’ and when he was 
finally awarded damages that fell vastly short of his expectations and expenses he 
turned his anger on John Tindall, a Master of Chancery.85 On 12 November 1616, 
Barterham followed Tindall while ‘full of rage, furie, and headlong indignation’ and 
after a little ‘uncivill language’ outside Lincoln’s Inn he shot him dead.86 The reporter 
on the case spoke of Barterham’s ‘melanchollie thoughts’, which he associated with the 
loss of control and anger.87 This was an idea that had common cultural purchase. Robert 
Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy of 1621 spoke of ‘Lust harrow[ing] us on the one side, 
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envy, anger, ambition on the other’, both sexes being ‘torn in pieces by our passions, as 
so many wild horses’ that become mad.88 Barterham hanged himself in the King’s 
Bench prison, a location loaded with the symbolism of fallen and dishonoured 
manhood.89 
It was in the very long cases, then, that emotions between litigants could turn 
into deeply negative emotions against Chancery. Chancery was, by its very nature, 
integrally involved in difficult local and familial disputes and if they were not quickly 
resolved the court became both solution to and cause of further social conflict. The 
Victorians did not invent the critique of Chancery. After all, as early as the 1590s 
Shakespeare wrote the famous line ‘let’s kill all the lawyers’.90 Much later, in 1828, a 
writer for the Monthly Magazine said that ‘the grand evil of the Court – its original sin – 
is the narrowness of its capacities relatively to the matters requiring its attention’ and he 
reached the unforgiving conclusion that ‘it is obvious that gentle medicines and 
soothing palliatives will be about as efficacious as breathing over a limb up to which 
mortification was crawling’.91 The Bob Cratchets were just so visible by then. They 
were to be seen either sitting at their wooden desks surrounded by alphabetically 
arranged pigeonholes or drinking coffee at Millington’s.92 But their visibility was not 
new either. The Six Clerks were established in an office in Chancery Lane from 1622 
where, according to one later, rather biased, commentator, they ‘performed their 
increasingly useless functions’.93 However, the terminology of Old Corruption was used 
by Chancery lawyers, themselves, when they were annoyed at having to put all business 
through the sworn clerks, who occasionally fell prey to a cull of their numbers.94 In 
other words, the social discourse of hating Chancery emanated as much from within the 
legal profession as without, as Chancery periodically underwent reform ahead of the 
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Judicature Act of 1873. For example, during the 1650s, when delays in Chancery 
became lengthy, the situation was seized upon by Exchequer lawyers who tried to 
attract Chancery litigants with the promise of shorter cases and after Chancery survived 
the Commonwealth period – becoming stronger because of reduced competition – 
cheaper under-clerks of Chancery quickly exploited the rising fees of the Six Clerks 
Office by offering to do the same job for half the price ‘more expeditiously’.95 Both 
served to feed a popular hatred of Chancery. 
One further factor accounts for the negative emotions aimed at Chancery. Equity 
law made it requisite that plaintiffs ‘show not only a cause of action in conscience but 
also the absence of a remedy at law’.96 Only a dogmatic escalation of emotions, in 
petitionary statements that transformed parties in a case into supplicants to the king's 
conscience, could succeed at showing absence of remedy at law. The emotive 
relationship invoked by equity law between monarch and subjects by legal process was 
summed up by one pamphleteer when he commented that ‘The Law is a dumbe King; 
the King a speaking Law’.97 Early modern litigants were highly indignant per se. Legal 
fees were a constant butt of jokes. Everything (absolutely everything) cost money – 
every term-hiring of an attorney, every injunction, every writ for execution of a decree, 
every decree (at £16 8s. in the 1650s, paid by plaintiff/s as well as defendant/s), every 
extra sheet of vellum if more than one piece was used, every enrolment of a deed, and 
so on and on.98 The devious clerks Prag and Prog in A New Case Put to an Old Lawyer 
of 1656 were ‘dangerous for mens purses’ and Hold-Case, the lawyer, had an alias of 
Long-Suit to indicate his propensity for spinning out proceedings.99 Prag had ‘a sublime 
and zealous spirit for advance of the Law’, though his main quality consisted of being 
able to procure for the Masters of Chancery ‘Decoys, Cheats, and meer Petty-fogging 
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Foists, and Hackney-Jades’.100 But such representations were inevitably Janus-faced 
because the principle of ‘no remedy at law’ created a mutual dependency between 
litigants and the monolith of equity that Chancery had become. Those who attempted to 
save the court from abolition claimed ‘the sweetnesse of Equity, which is nothing else 
but Mercy qualifying the sharpnese of Justice’.101 The anonymous writer of 
Considerations Touching the Dissolving or Taking Away the Court of Chancery 
reminded potential litigants of the substantial benefits to them of invoking equity: ‘[t]he 
Wolf may eat the Lamb, when there shall be none to stretch out their hand to deliver the 
oppressed.’102 Written in 1653, after the regicide, it would seem that when the chips 
were down for lawyers, the king’s conscience did not need a king. The writer also 
issued a dire warning to the Commonwealth – if Chancery collapsed, ‘the heap of new 
causes’ would ‘swell up the discontents of the people’.103 Commercialization of printing 
and the expansion of print culture after the 1650s ensured that Chancery cases, such as 
The Case of Sir Robert Atkyns … against a Decree Obtain’d by Mrs. Elizabeth Took of 
1695, appealed to an expanding market for scandal that was also fed by trial accounts of 
adultery and divorce cases (especially after the Norfolk case of 1700) and ordinaries’ 
accounts of criminal trials such as that of Stephen Arrowsmith for rape of a child.104 
The law of conscience transformed easily into morality tale, though the reporter on the 
Tindall murder went one step further to undermine the prerogative of the king in 
Chancery: ‘Rulers and Maiestrates, are Gods upon earth, yet they are Mortall Gods.’105 
Studying Chancery without studying in detail the litigants is like studying only 
one half of an equation. The freedom of contract thought to belong to the Lockeian 
private individual, or individual conceptualized as free to contract with others, was not 
so new to the late seventeenth century. At least from the late sixteenth century, there 
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had been a need for systematic and growing intervention in private affairs by public 
institutions. Chancery was one of those institutions because, as Michael McKeon’s 
work has so acutely revealed, there was never anything secret really about people’s 
domestic and working lives.106 The category of knowledge that was classified as private 
law was shaped by the changing needs of individuals over time and the informal and 
extra-institutional identity of the legally informed individual formed a public that could 
(and did) use its knowledge of law to invoke the conscience of the queen/king to their 
own advantage. Emotions articulated in court about private life created a bond that 
connected litigant and lawyer in a dialectical process that affected not only the 
individual but also collective outcomes, including legal change.107 
Emotions in Chancery ran high between litigants and were aimed also at the 
court and its personnel. Indeed, Chancery was doomed to frustrate and anger its clients. 
It collected evidence of their distress with one another and required that they articulate 
emotions to make the very sort of case that would be put to the law of equity and 
conscience. The emotional outbursts of litigants easily deflected at the court itself. 
Thomas Audley’s 1526 analysis of the impact of equity touching the individual’s 
possessive instinct is instructive. Use of property depended ‘solely on confidence and 
trust between those who are in actual possession’ and when possession was in direct 
contradistinction to enfeoffment at common law, then equity law made everyone 
uncertain of their title ‘for now land passes by words and bare proofs in the Chancery’ 
according to ‘the whim (arbitrement) of the judge in conscience’.108 Legal intervention 
– once invoked – was identified with the Lord Chancellor whose authority was 
representative of the monarch and state governance and who could, therefore, become 
the focus of popular discontent. Furthermore, the 1536 Statute of Uses placed 
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confidence and trust at the heart of how Chancery dispensed justice, when the concept 
of use, which Henry Sherfield in 1623 called ‘bastardly’, meant that estates had started 
passing through use and not common law to the point where ‘the use is somewhat 
clogged, that it cannot dance up and down at all times so lightly as it could before it was 
clogged with the estate’.109 Dickens could not have said it better. The somewhat 
indeterminate law of use and possession meant that litigants had to take it very much on 
trust that Edward Coke was right when he said that Chancery ‘will not order a matter … 
which is directly against a rule and maxim of the common law’.110 ‘Where Certainty 
wanteth, the common Law faileth’, according to one legal report of 1665, but ‘help is to 
be found in Chancery’.111 These principles heightened the collective belief of lawyers in 
the effective role of conscience as a calibrator of common law, when what was actually 
on offer was constant accumulation of case law that was supposed to determine 
byzantine distribution of real estate and capital assets. Chancery became an edifice that 
just could not live up to its own ideals and, as has been shown, between 1550 and 1650 
it was already producing cases that provided the model for Jarndyce v Jarndyce. 
However, the strongest evidence of the largely negative emotional response to Chancery 
can be found in the wake of the regicide, when the execution of the king led to an 
almost complete collapse in popular belief in the court’s ability to deliver justice 
through a law based on the king’s conscience. The survival of Chancery after the 
regicide may well have been to fulfil continued social need for arbitration in property 
and debt disputes. Litigants and the court remained locked in a destructive mutual 
dependency that simply ensured the ire of future generations of litigants. Indeed, 
Chancery litigants and lawyers continued to be irritable with one another and they 
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simply learnt afresh how to criticize Chancery and to find ways of emoting both in 
pleadings and in print. 
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